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state legislatures will be under pressure from hospitals and their in-
surers to initiate legislation to prevent such imposition of liability. The
Florida legislature was under this sort of pressure after the decision in
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,34 and a statute effectively over-
ruling that decision resulted.a5
JUDITH FINKEL RINSKY
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF AND THE CONCURRENT
SENTENCE DOCTRINE
The petitioner, who was serving concurrent sentences for convic-
tions of robbery and uttering a forged instrument,' sought to have the
robbery conviction set aside on the ground that his right of appeal from
the conviction had been thwarted. Petitioner contended that he had re-
quested his privately retained attorney to file a motion for new trial and
notice of appeal; however, his attorney had advised him that he had
been retained for trial work only and that if he wished for an appeal to
be taken, a separate fee would have to be paid. Since this fee was not
paid, the attorney never filed the motion for a new trial or notice of
appeal.2 After an unsuccessful attempt to have the judgment vacated,8
petitioner then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The respondent argued that the writ could not be issued because
Florida recognized the concurrent sentence doctrine which precluded
issuance of the writ when the petitioner attacks only one of the sentences
he is serving. Held: A prisoner serving concurrent sentences may use
habeas corpus to attack the one sentence while still serving the other
34. In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), it was
held that the supply of blood from a commercial blood bank was a sale and consequently, a
cause of action was allowed for breach of an implied warranty.
35. The legislature then adopted FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1969), which declared that
any procurement or distribution of blood for transfusions is "the rendering of a service by
any person participating therein, and does not constitute a sale, ... and the implied war-
ranties of merchantability ... shall not be applicable. . . ." This effectively overrules the
result of Russell and takes the blood bank out of the scope of liability based on implied
warranty.
It is conceivable that a legislature might pass a similar statute declaring that blood shall
not be considered an unreasonably dangerous product for the purposes of the imposition of
strict tort liability, and thus avoid the result of the principal case.
1. Petitioner, James D. Frizzell, was incarcerated under two sentences for a term of
ten years.
2. This alleged error was first raised and considered on a motion to vacate under FLA.
R. CRm. P. 1.850. The circuit court denied the motion and, on appeal, the District Court
of Florida, Second District, affirmed, holding that in a collateral post-conviction proceeding
a defendant cannot seek reversal for what his privately retained counsel failed to do. Friz-
zell v. State, 213 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
3. Id.
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even though it will not entitle him to immediate release. Frizzell v. State,
238 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1970) (writ discharged on other grounds). 4
The writ of habeas corpus is deeply rooted in the common law.
Essentially, it is a writ of inquiry which challenges the jurisdiction of
the court that incarcerated the prisoner.5 It is a high prerogative writ
which traditionally afforded relief only in cases of illegal confinement.'
Originally, such a writ would not be issued unless it resulted in the im-
mediate release of the prisoner from confinement. Therefore, even if a
prisoner serving concurrent sentences successfully argued that one of them
was unlawful, the writ would not lie for it would not result in his imme-
diate release. Likewise, if a prisoner used the writ to challenge the
validity of a consecutive sentence, the petition would be discharged as
premature; the principal reason being the historical conception of habeas
corpus as a remedy only for those unlawfully detained. Accordingly, the
test for granting a petition was whether the issuance of the writ would
result in the restoration of the petitioner's liberty.
In McNally v. Hill,T the United States Supreme Court established
the federal rule that a writ of habeas corpus is unavailable to a petitioner
unless his present confinement is pursuant to the challenged sentence.
McNally was originally sentenced on a three-count indictment. While
he was serving sentence for the second count, he sought habeas corpus
relief on the ground that the third count was defective.' The Court re-
fused to rule on the merits and discharged the writ as premature. Thus,
in this narrow interpretation of the federal habeas corpus statutes,9 the
Supreme Court gave birth to the prematurity rule. Relying primarily
upon historical precedent the Court interpreted in custody to mean both
that petitioner be presently incarcerated under an invalid sentence1" and
that the issuance of the writ result in the prisoner's immediate release
from confinement.1
4. The Court discharged the writ holding that the petitioner's contentions were "utterly
devoid of merit." However, the Court expressly receded from all its prior decisions concern-
ing the concurrent sentence doctrine and the prematurity rule.
5. The writ does not extend to the record itself but only reaches the body of the
prisoner.
6. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).
7. 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
8. The petitioner contended that the third count did not state an offense under federal
law. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 134 (1934).
9. In 1934, the statutes involved were 28 U.S.C. §§ 451-453. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). The present statutory suc-
cessor to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451-453, Section 2241 provides in part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in the custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Con-
gress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or Laws or Treaties of
the United States; ...
10. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934).
11. Id. at 137-38.
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The fact that the United States Supreme Court began immediately to
whittle away at the principle enunciated in McNally evidenced its weak-
nesses and foreshadowed its demise. Ex Parte Hull 2 was the first in a
long line of decisions which circumvented the McNally in custody re-
quirement. In Hull, the petitioner's parole was repealed because of a con-
viction which occurred during his parole period. Hull was thereafter re-
manded to prison to complete the term for his first conviction. The Court
held that the petitioner could successfully challenge the second convic-
tion notwithstanding that he was validly in custody under the first sen-
tence. The governing rationale of the Court in not invoking the pre-
maturity rule was that the validity of the petitioner's present confinement
was entirely dependent on the second conviction. 8 Thus, in effect, the
petitioner was in custody under the second sentence. Subsequent to Hull
the Supreme Court relaxed its strictness in defining custody 4 and even-
tually struck down the prematurity rule in the landmark case of Peyton
v. Rowe.' In Rowe, the Court held that a prisoner serving consecutive
sentences is in custody under any one of them for purposes of habeas
corpus proceedings. 6
It is surprising that the Supreme Court took as many years as it did
to strike down the untenable principle it established in McNally. Except
for its adherence to the custody requirements of the federal habeas
corpus statutes, the prematurity rule had no basis in logic or reason. Post-
poning the adjudication of invalid convictions diminishes the chances for
both the prisoner and the state that "final disposition of the case [would]
do substantial justice."'1 7 This follows since postponement results in the
death of witnesses, dimmed memories, loss of records, and other impedi-
ments which were "bound to render it difficult or impossible to secure
crucial testimony in disputed issues of fact."'" Also, the prematurity rule
in many instances led to the extended confinement of many prisoners
entitled to release. This was clearly "at odds with a principle aim of the
writ which [was] to provide swift judicial review of alleged unlawful
12. Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
13. In other words, the Court reasoned that the confinement should be treated as being
caused by the challenged sentence, although technically Hull was not in custody under the
challenged term. Id.
14. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963), the Court held, inter alia,
that the prisoner, although paroled, was still very much "in custody" within the meaning
of the federal habeas corpus statutes because the parole board imposed restrictions and
conditions which "significantly confine and restrain his freedom."
Another example is the circuit court case of Martin v. Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir.
1965), wherein the court held that when sentences to be served in the future bar one's
eligibility for parole, the prisoner is validly "in custody" thereunder because a valid re-
straint on liberty exists.
15. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
16. In Stepp v. Beto, 398 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1968), the court extended Rowe to the
situation where one was serving concurrent sentences.
17. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968).
18. Id. at 62.
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restraints on liberty."1 Prisoners were precluded from challenging con-
secutive or concurrent convictions until the end of the valid sentence
for which they were in custody. Consequently, the time the prisoner
remained in prison while attacking the alleged invalid sentence was time
he should have spent as a free man. Thus, the effect of Rowe was to
obviate the requirement of eligibility for immediate release and to pro-
vide for the fundamental right of swift judicial review.
Initially all state courts followed McNally, although they were
never subject to its scriptures and were free to establish their own
precedents. However, before the McNally rule was formally laid to rest
in Rowe, a few state courts had already discarded the prematurity rule.
California, in Ex parte Chapman,0 was the first state to question
the propriety of the McNally dogma. The court overruled a demurrer
which was based on the prematurity rule that the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be issued unless the prisoner is entitled to immediate release.
Apparently, the court recognized the harshness of the effect of the pre-
maturity rule on parole eligibility.
Many other states have abandoned the prematurity concept in at
least one of its aspects.21 It is difficult to ascertain which states still
adhere to the rule because a few provide statutory post-conviction reme-
dies, 22 while others provide a broad remedy through the writ of error
coram nobis. Under whatever guise the remedy might fall is of no
consequence, so long as there exists some vehicle to challenge invalid
sentences.
The Florida courts' treatment of the prematurity rule is essentially
the same as that of the federal courts. Traditionally, the question of
prematurity arose in the following situations:
1) Concurrent Sentences, One of Which is Challenged. The federal
courts would not issue the writ in this situation, because even if a prisoner
successfully challenged one sentence, he would still be legally in custody
under the other. Florida has followed the federal decisions in all cases,23
with the exception of one decision which can be easily reconciled. 24
19. Id. at 63.
20. 43 Cal. App. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Meyers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965),
where in a well-documented opinion, Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority, traced
the history of the archaic prematurity rule. In this writer's opinion, Mr. Robert's erudite
discourse resulted in the United States Supreme Court's abrogation of the rule.
22. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 34.330, 138.510-680 (1963). The statute does not
expressly require that the petitioner be in custody for the sentence he is attacking.
23. Alderman v. State, 188 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1966); Hollingshed v. Mayo, 79 So.2d 774
(Fla. 1955).
24. In Dora v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1962), petitioner successfully challenged
a consecutive robbery conviction, notwithstanding that he was validly in custody for escape.
At the time petitioner was convicted for robbery, he was a minor and notice was not given
to his parents as required by FiA. STAT. § 932.38 (1969). Thus, petitioner was denied his
constitutional right of procedural due process. The proper relief at that time was through
1971]
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2) Consecutive Sentences, the First of Which is Challenged. In
this situation the prisoner is illegally confined under the first sentence,
but there exists a valid consecutive sentence. Thus, assuming arguendo
that the courts issued the writ to invalidate the first sentence, the prisoner
would then be detained under the valid consecutive sentence. Until 1968,25
the federal courts refused to issue the writ in this situation.26 On the
other hand, Florida has never questioned the right of a prisoner to attack
an invalid sentence presently being served.27 Unlike the federal courts,
Florida was never restricted by the immediate release concept 28 and thus,
was free to issue the writ.
3) Consecutive Sentences, the Second of Which is Challenged. This
was the McNally situation which the Supreme Court overruled in Rowe
and which Florida, by way of very strong dicta, receded from in the
instant case. It presented the greatest conceptual difficulty because the
prisoner was neither confined under an illegal sentence nor (assuming a
favorable decision) entitled to immediate release. Historically, this line
of reasoning had a rational basis. The writ was primarily used to release
from jail prisoners who had been sentenced erroneously. Today, how-
ever, the writ is not generally used to attack the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court. Instead it is a means to challenge the grounds for the
conviction and the procedures used by the court.
The state, in the instant case, argued that the abrogation of the
applicability of the concurrent sentence doctrine to this situation would
"result in a substantially increased load of cases on the already over-
burdened courts as persons serving several concurrent sentences attack
each of them individually."2 Similar attempts to resist change in the
name of "judicial convenience" were inveighed against Gideon;30 but to
no avail. Judicial convenience does not outweigh the convenience to those
imprisoned for far too long. Delaying a prisoner's right to attack any
conviction on its merits would not aid the administration of justice; it
would only postpone until tomorrow decisions which could be more fairly
made today.
The prematurity rule was an anachronism in a society which has
habeas corpus proceedings. Today, such relief would be obtained through FLA. R. CRw.
P. 1.850 (formerly FLA. R. CRim. P. 1).
25. The Supreme Court in Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968), held that a
prisoner can successfully challenge an invalid first sentence notwithstanding that there
existed a valid consecutive sentence and that he would not be entitled to immediate release
from confinement.
26. This was because of dicta in McNally to the effect that a writ of habeas corpus
could not be used as a means of securing judicial decisions of questions which, even if
determined in the prisoner's favor, would not result in immediate release. McNally v. Hill,
293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934).
27. Keene v. Cochran, 146 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1962); Vellucci v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 510
(Fla. 1962) ; Falagon v. State, 167 So.2d 62 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
28. One of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964), in effect says that the prisoner
must he entitled to immediate release.
29. Frizzell v. State, 238 So.2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1970).
30. Gideon v. Wainwright, 272 U.S. 335 (1963).
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steadily increased the rights of prisoners. It belonged to an age where
there was a distinct line between imprisonment and freedom. With the
advent of modern penal, parole, and probation techniques the rule became
obsolete.
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